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Abstract
High  levels of protection and  domestic support for  The authors  develop a simple partial equilibrium
farmers  in industrial  countries significantly  affect many  model of global trade  in commodities  that benefit from
developing  cotintries, both  directly and through the  domestic support in  at least one WTO member.  The
price-depressing  effect of agricultural  support policies.  simulation  results suggest there will  be large  differences
High tariffs-in  both rich  and poor countries-and  between  LDCs and other  developing  economies  in terms
domestic support may also  lower the world  price of  of the impact of a 50 percent cut in tariffs as compared
agricultural  products,  benefiting net importers.  to a 50 percent cut in domestic support.  Developing
Hoekman,  Ng, and Olarreaga  assess the impact of  countries as a group  would suffer  a welfare  loss  from a
reducing tariffs and domestic support in  a sample  of 119  cut  in support,  while LDCs would experience  a small
countries.  Least developed  countries  (LDCs) are  gain.  For both groups of countries,  tariff reductions by
disproportionately  affected by  agriculttiral  support  WTO  members-including  own liberalization-will  have
policies.  More than  18 percent  of LDC exports are  a positive  effect on  welfare. The results show both the
subject  to domestic  support in at least one World Trade  importance  of focusing on  tariffs as  well as subsidies,  and
Organization  (WTO)  member, as compared to only  9  the need  for complementary  actions to allow a domestic
percent  of their imports.  For other developing countries  supply response  to occur in  developing countries if world
the figures are around  4 percent for both  their exports  prices  rise.
and imports.  So, the prevailing  pattern  of trade  stiggests
the world  price-reducinig  effect of agricultural  domestic
support policies  may induce  a welfare loss in LDCs.
This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research GrotIp-is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze the effects
of trade-related policies on developing cotintries. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Rebecca  Martin,  room MC3-303,  telephone  202-473-9065,  fax 202-522-
1159,  email  address  rmartinl@(worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers  are  also  posted on the  Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  bhoekman@worldbank.org,  fng@worldbank.org,  or
molarreaga@worldbank.org.  March  2003.  (39  pages)
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papers carry the nanies of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed tn this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the  vietw  of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Developing country agricultural  exports are limited by high tariffs in many countries.  Domestic
support for farmers in high-income economies also hurts developing country exporters to the
extent that it boosts domestic production, depresses world prices, exacerbates  the volatility of
world prices and reduces the scope for import competition.  High tariffs and domestic support
policies may, however, benefit net importers of agriculture products in developing countries by
providing access to the subsidized commodities  at lower prices.'  Thus, as is well known, national
interests regarding reform of OECD agricultural trade and support policies will differ.  However,
most analyses conclude that the overall gain to developing countries from reforming agricultural
policies greatly outweighs the potential costs to countries that are significant net importers of
subsidized agricultural  products.
Starting in 2000, negotiations were launched in the WTO to further reduce intervention in
agricultural markets.  These negotiations focus on both subsidy policies and border protection
(tariffs and tariff rate quotas).  An important policy question confronting developing countries is
to determine which instruments of agricultural protection are most detrimental  to their interests.
In this paper we attempt to shed some light on this issue by assessing the relative impact of
tariffs and domestic support policies  on exports and welfare of developing countries.
Specifically, we assess the impact of a 50 percent global reduction in agricultural tariffs and
compare this to a 50 percent cut in domestic support.2 Our objective is to assess where
negotiating efforts in the context of the current WTO negotiations on agriculture might be best
directed.
We find that in welfare terms, tariffs matter significantly mnore than subsidy policies-
tariff reductions  generate welfare  gains that are substantially greater than reductions in support
policies.3 In large part this is because of high tariff peaks in OECD countries and because
developing countries also use iariffs to protect domestic production. As is almost always the
case, when it comes to trade policy reform, the principle 'what you do determines what you get'
applies. This does not imply that negotiations should therefore emphasize tariffs over domestic
' This potential national welfare benefit is offset by the higher price volatility created by support policies as country
specific shocks may be transferred to world markets.  In  this paper we ignore the extent to which price volatility is
transmitted to world markets.
2 The policy simulation can  be  motivated  by a conservative  interpretation of the  Doha declaration:  "....we commit
ourselves  to comprehensive  negotiations aimed  at: substantial  improvements  in market access,  reduction of, with a
view to phasing  out, all forms of export subsidies;  and substantial reductions  in trade-distorting  domestic support"
(WTO Doha Ministerial  Declaration,  para 13, November 2001).support policies. A major political  economy problem confronting WTO negotiators is to create
incentives  for countries to liberalize agricultural  trade. Many observers oppose further
agricultural trade liberalization in an environment that is characterized by continued large-scale
support for OECD farmers. Past experience has demonstrated that the gains from own
liberalization may be attenuated because of the market segmenting  effect of OECD subsidy
policies, and in some instances-e.g.,  India-liberalization  proved to be politically unsustainable
as farmers are subjected  to large world price swings and import surges of subsidized
commodities  (Gulati and Narayanan, 2002). Substantial  reduction in OECD agricultural support
policies is therefore not just important for developing countries in its own right-in that it
generates direct benefits  for the many economies that are (potential) net exporters-but is critical
to support efforts by developing  country governments to pursue domestic reforms.  That is,
subsidy reforms  in OECD countries are necessary, but not sufficient,  for developing countries to
reap significant gains from the current WTO negotiations on agriculture.
In contrast to many quantitative analyses of the effects of agricultural  trade policies, we
use a partial equilibrium framework to estimate the impact of policy changes for a sample of 119
countries on world prices of agricultural commodities that benefit from domestic support in at
least one WTO member. We limit the analysis to products that benefit from domestic support in
order not to bias our findings. Because most countries apply tariffs to all agricultural products,
not just those that are subsidized, any comparison of the effect of reducing tariffs on all
agricultural goods with a reduction in support policies would conclude that tariffs are more
important for developing countries. The partial equilibrium  approach allows us to assess the
effects of policy changes on individual countries,  including low income and least developed
economies that are of particular concern to the development community. The majority of these
countries are generally subsumed in regional aggregates  in applied general equilibrium models.
The partial equilibrium approach also allows us to use disaggregated trade and protection data-
we work at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized  System.4
3 Note that export subsidies are left outside the analysis but these are relatively small as they represent only 8-10
percent of total domestic support.
4 For recent CGE studies focusing on the same question see Beghin, Roland-Hoist  and van der Mensbrugghe  (2002),
Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney  (2002) and Rae and Strutt (2002). These studies obtain qualitatively similar results
(i.e., border barriers matter more than domestic support).
22  Tariffs and domestic  support in agriculture
Agricultural  products are often subject to tariff peaks that are  100 percent or higher (Hoekman,
Ng and Olarreaga,  2002). The average MFN tariff that is applied to agricultural products varies
substantially across countries, but in the majority of OECD cowatries is more than double the
average that applies for manufactures.  In addition to tariffs, many high-income  countries
subsidize domestic  agriculture. WTO data indicate that there are  158 commodities at the 6-digit
level of the Harmonized System (HS) that benefit from domestic support in at least one WTO
member. Large-scale use of domestic support is primarily founcl in OECD countries,  especially
the EU, Japan and the United States. Industrialized countries account for 88 percent of total
domestic support payments; if South Korea and transition economies  such as Poland are
excluded, developing countries account for only 10 percent of total support reported to the WTO
during 1995-6  (Table  1). Major subsidizers among developing  countries include  Brazil, Thailand
and Venezuela.  Not surprisingly, least developed countries (LDCs) report virtually no domestic
support. Meat, dairy, cereals and sugar account for the lion's share of domestic support,
representing almost 75 percent of all reported non-exempt domestic support (WTO categories
DS4-9) (Table 2).
The average tariff on these subsidized products is around  18 percent,  -with  peaks in the
100-200  percent range for many countries (Table  3). Average tariffs are relatively uniformly
distributed across major product categories,  with the highest applying in dairy and sugar (and
alcoholic beverages-a special case given use of tariffs for revenue and cultural purposes)  (Table
4). These are also the sectors that have the highest levels of domestic support. A number of
countries make intensive use of specific tariffs for agricultural  imports. One consequence of this
is that statutory average ad valorem MFN tariffs understate the level of tariff protection,
especially for the EU and Japan.5 In this paper we use estimates of ad valorein equivalents of
specific tariffs for the  158 tariff lines on which the analysis focuses,  drawing on data reported in
Stawowy (2001) and OECD (2000) at the tariff line level. Given that estimates of ad valorem
equivalents for Switzerland are incomplete and unreliable, we have excluded this country from
the analysis (Switzerland relies almost completely  on specific tariffs).
The global pattern of protection and support to agriculture will have differential  impacts
on countries depending on whether they are net producers or consumers of the commodities
5 Fontagne et al. (2002) report that the EU, Japan and the US have  1,059, 418 and  1,148 six-digit tariff lines that are
subject to specific tariffs.
3affected.  A first cut at identifying the likely implications  of protectionist policies for individual
countries is to calculate the relative importance of exports and imports of the products that are
subsidized by at least one WTO member.  Such data reveal that LDCs are potentially much more
affected than other countries:  18 percent of their exports on average comprise  goods that are
subsidized in at least one WTO member, compared to 3-4 percent for other countries (Table 5).
A similar observation holds for imports-nine percent of LDC imports involve products that are
subsidized, compared to 3-4 percent for other countries.  For many LDCs the potential incidence
of subsidies is therefore very high. Indeed, for countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Chad, Malawi,  Mali, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe,  60 to 80 percent of total
exports comprise goods that are subsidized by one or more WTO members. Given that these are
also countries that tend to have preferential-mostly  duty-free-access to the European market
(through the GSP and Everything  But Arms initiative), this suggests subsidies are an important
issue for WTO negotiations (as subsidies are not covered by preferential  access agreements).6
However, this ignores the depressing effects of tariffs by major WTO members on world prices,
as well as the impact of own tariffs-issues  that are explored empirically below.
Table 5 also identifies countries where the ratio of imports of subsidized  goods to total
imports is higher than the ratio of "affected"  exports to total exports. In such cases it is possible
that global  liberalization may have short run negative effects on the terms of trade and/or welfare
insofar as the prices of imports are lowered because of subsidies.  Countries where the balance is
tilted towards imports of subsidized commodities comprise countries at very different levels of
per capita incomes.  They include Bangladesh,  Comoros, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea,  Jordan, Korea,
Maldives,  Mauritania,  Morocco, Nigeria, Oman,  Saudi Arabia,  Senegal, Taiwan,  Tunisia and
Venezuela.
The agricultural domestic support numbers reported to the WTO comprise a mix of
instruments and measures.  The major distinction that is made is between measures that are
exempted from WTO reduction commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture and those that are not. The former include so-called green box support, measures
whose use is permitted for developing countries and payments under production limiting
6  It is difficult to assess to which extent EBA offers actual preferential access to LDCs as rules of origin and other
non-tariff barriers  may actually erode the preferential access granted on paper. In the case of the US initiative for
Sub-Saharan Africa (AGOA), there is data made publicly available on the actual gains for African countries and
these tend to be small (Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian,  2002).  In the case of Europe, Brenton and Manchin (2002)
show evidence  that  EU preferential access  schemes have offered limited benefits due to restrictive rules of origin.
4programs (including the blue box).7 The latter include measures that are deemed to directly
support production.  As our interest  in this paper is to compare the effect of border protection
(tariffs)  with domestic  subsidy-type support on a product-by-product  basis, we use the WTO
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) data,  as this does not include the effect of border barriers.
We recognize that there are a number of limitations associated  with the AMS data.  One problem
is that the time period for which data are available is short and reporting  is incomplete, especially
for more recent years. This is discussed further in the data annex. Another problem is that the
economic relevance of the AMS time series is limited given the use of the fixed 1986-88
benchmark for purposes of calculating price  support. However, given that the econometric and
simulation work is done for one point in time (the average for 1995-1998),  this should be less of
a problem in this paper.
3  Analytical framework
To estimate the impact that a reduction in tariffs and/or domestic support may have on exports
and welfare we use a simple partial equilibrium model. World markets are  assumed to be
perfectly competitive and integrated,  in the sense that'there-is no further scope for arbitrage
across countries.  Products traded in world markets under the same 6-digit F[S classification are
considered  to be perfectly  homogenous.9 Each 6-digit HS product category represents only a
small share of the economy, so that the effect on other product markets of changes in a particular
category is negligible.'0
Import demand for each HS-6-digit product of country c is given by:
aC  ~~~~~~~~~~~~(1)
"I+  tC XI  +.r r]d 
' See  Hoekman and Kostecki (2001)  for a review of the WTO Agreement  on Agriculture.
8 See de Gorter (2002) for a careful discussion of problems associated with measurement of the AMS.
9 In practice there may be heterogeneity even at the 6-digit level in that imports (or exports) may be of a higher
quality than exports (imports).  In some developing countries high quality imports may have only a limited degree of
competition  with low quality domestic production. If so, this will imply that traditional  measures of protection such
as the ratio of import to domestic price for the product will overstate the magnitude of protection.  In this paper we
use only tariffs, not the nominal rate-of protection.
'O  The setup is very similar to the one in Zietz and Valdes (1986) and Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002).  The latter
discuss some of the caveats associated with the use of this type of model. Note that no account is taken of issues
such as the potential .impact of exchange rate overvaluation,  indirect taxes and other factors that may result in an
overall anti-agriculture bias and thus offset the effect of tariff protection  and/or subsidy policies. Schiff and Valdes
(1998)  suggest that in many developing countries  anti-agriculture bias due to such policies has  declined,  implying
that direct  instruments such as tariffs and subsidies are the major determinants  of the magnitude of protection.
5where 8 d  is the import demand elasticity,  pw  is the price in the "world" market;  t,  is the tariff
in country c;  cc  is the average transport cost from country  c to the "world" market;"I  SC  is the
producer support in country c;12  Ad  is the elasticity of import demand to the producer support;
and  ac  is a demand parameter in country c that captures  size and all other factors influencing
import demand.
Export supply for each HS-6-digit product of country  c is given by:
F  16
Xc = bc  P(l  +  )  S  (2)
where 8s  is the export supply elasticity,  2 A  is the elasticity of export supply with respect to
domestic support;' 3 and  bc  is a supply parameter that captures  size and other determinants of
export supply.  The transport cost to world markets is also common among exporters and
importers of the same product.  The presence of tariffs and domestic  support measures may lead
to both imports and exports of a homogenous product for a given country.
We are forced by data constraints to assume that the import demand and export supply
elasticities for products, as well as the import and export elasticities with respect to domestic
support, are identical  for all countries in the sample. This has implications  for the implied
domestic supply and demand elasticities of domestic support across the countries in our dataset.
For example, if these were relatively similar across countries, and consumption were to be only
marginally affected by changes in domestic  support, then import demand elasticities should vary
across countries depending on the ratio of domestic production to exports. Given that production
and consumption data are not available at the six-digit level of the Harmonized  System, we
cannot estimate underlying domestic  demand and supply elasticities. In the empirical analysis
below we test to what extent the assumption of identical elasticities across countries has
implications for our results.
This explains differences  in import prices across  different countries as observed in the data.
12 We attribute to countries with no domestic support a $1  value for the import demand function not to be
undetermined.
13  Again,  we attribute to countries  with no domestic support a $1 dollar value for the export supply function not to
be undetermined.  The same caveat as in the previous footnote applies.
6The equilibrium world price is obtained by solving for the world price in the world
market clearing condition, i.e.,
l/(g.v+ed)
'7  ~~ac
ew  = argslE  tc  XI +VA  =  =,3 PW  ;0  -xc  =01=  o  [( +ti  S~]  (3)
Pw  C  C  ,E  bS
Pw  c c  ~  ~  bcsc
c  (I+vrc)
The change in the world equilibrium price following a reduction in tariffs is obtained by taking
the total differential of (3) with respect to  rc . The percentage change in the world price with
respect to a common percentage  change in tariffs in all countries  is then:
d  (+C)  [(I + tc  1  4
Pw -d+  6st  ac  d 
L .J(I + tc Xl + TC )SC
where a "hat"  (A)  denotes the percentage change in the variable.
Similarly, the percentage  change in world prices following a common percentage change
in subsidies,  s, is given by:1 4
E  SC  -1  ac  s  -1  bcsK
A  d  C  S  (+  .X  T,)SC  S.C  C{I+T)(5
L  c  [(+  tcXl + Tc )]  Sc  c  (1 + Tc ),
The change  in export revenue and import revenue associated with a change in tariffs or domestic
support is given by:
14 Here we do not change the $1  domestic support subsidy attributed to  countries with no domestic  support.
7Xc  (+  )P+  As  S 
SC  (6)
(d\~~~d  _A  t  Scl
mt =-g  -l)pw  -g  t___c 
c  I ~~~~+  tC  SC
where ix  is the percentage change in export revenue in country  c, and  i4  is the percentage
change in import revenue in country c. Note that if there is no producer support or tariffs in
country c, then there will be no changes in export revenue  or import revenue in this country,  a
part from those induced by the change in world price after other countries have reduced their
tariffs or producer support.
Finally, one can measure the change in welfare in an importing and exporting country by
taking the integral of the import demand and export supply functions with respect to world prices
and tariffs (it is assumed that domestic support is just a transfer from government revenue to
producers).  The change in exporters and importers welfare relative to their initial export and
import revenue  is then given by:
C  A+,(  + Pw  1+  s  )
c  ~  d'  Ad  +  (7)  s 
tc  t  S
tCr  +t  C
where wvx  is the change in welfare in an exporting country relative to the initial export revenue;15
wCv  is the change in welfare in an importing country relative to the initial import revenue. The
first term on the right-hand-side of i4 7'  is the change in import consumer surplus and the second
term is the change in tariff revenue. Note that changes in welfare  in (7) take into account shifts of
domestic import demand and export supply functions following changes in domestic  tariffs and
domestic support (when relevant).  The overall change in welfare can be obtained by adding up
'5 Note that is exactly  equal to the percentage  change in world prices if the elasticity of export supply is nil.
8the two expressions in (7) after normalizing the two terms to the same base (either exports,
imports, total trade, or in $ per capita terms).
4  Empirical methodology
The empirical methodology consists of three steps. First we estimate import demand and export
supply elasticities with respect to prices and subsidies  (i.e.,  gd  6s  Ad and As).  We then
calibrate the demand and supply parameters  (i.e.,  a,  and b, ) for each country and product (at the
HS six-digit level). Finally, we use the elasticities and calibratecl parameters to measure the
changes in world prices, export revenue, import revenue and welfare following a 50 percent
reduction in agriculture  tariffs and domestic support in all countries.
To estimate the different elasticities, we could simply estimate the import demand and
export supply functions  (1) and (2). However, these are simultaneously determined  in any
country c. Moreover, we do not observe "world" prices, but only export and import unit values in
each country, which include transport costs. If traded quantities  are measured with error (which
is likely as customs generally are more concerned  with value), unit values will also be measured
with error, which may bias our results.'6 To avoid these problems we first choose units so that
the average world price of each product for the period  1995-199 8 is equal to 1. We then estimate,
across countries and products, the net import demand function as the log difference of import
demand and export supply for each country (measured in value terms due to the choice of units)
in each country. Note that the world prices will then drop from this specification as
log(p,) = log(1) = 0.
Using the import demand and export supply functions in equations  (1) and (2),  we obtain
the following estimating equation:
log(mr )_ log(x' )= log(aj  )-  log(b, ) _d log(1 + t- )-
(ed  _  Es )log(l + r-  - (d  + X )log(s,  (
16 Note that it is not clear what can be use as an instrument for unit values at the six digit level of the harmonized
system.
9As controls for ac and bC  we use GDP and population in each country. Product dummies at the
HS six-digit level are also included.17
In the second step, using the elasticities  estimated using a stochastic version of (8), we
calibrate  ac and bc using (1) and (2). The estimation of changes in world prices, import revenue,
export revenue and welfare is done using equations (4) to (7).
Data on import and export revenue as well as tariffs are available from the World Bank
WITS database at the six digit of the harmonized system. The measure of domestic support that
is used is the WTO Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), obtained from the WTO, based on
member notifications (WTO document G/AG/NGIS/1, April  13, 2000). The AMS data are based
on an arbitrary product classification  and were concorded to the HS classification (see the Data
Annex).
Only 30 WTO members have made domestic  support reduction commitments under the
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), but all members are required to notify domestic  support.
Compliance is weak-in 1995 only 75 percent of all WTO members that were required to notify,
did so. In 1996 and  1997 the coverage drops to around 50 percent; for 1998  only 28 percent of
WTO members had notified by March 2000. However, most countries that did not notify in
1997-8 had very little or no support in 1995-6, so the coverage of the data spans the major users.
To address the incomplete reporting problem, we use the average AMS reported for whatever
years are available.  The empirical analysis therefore  involves an unbalanced panel.
Domestic support notified to the WTO includes exempt and non-exempt measures. There
are nine categories of support, designated DS 1 through DS9. DS 1 covers  measures that WTO
members have placed in the "green box", and are therefore exempt from reductions  (the green
box categories  are defined  in Annex 2 of the AoA). DS2 comprises measures that, for developing
countries, are exempt from reduction commitments under Article 6.2 of the AoA relating to
development programs. DS3 is used to signify direct payments under production-limiting
programs under Article 6.5 of the AoA.  Categories DS4 to DS9 comprise measures that are not
necessarily exempt from reduction commitments.  DS4 refers to non-exempt support that is
below the de minimis level (as set out in Article 6.4 of the AoA).  The remaining  categories
included in the total AMS of WTO members include market price support (DS5), non-exempt
'1 A justification for the introduction of GDP and population as control variables  could be associated  with the idea
that import demand for agriculture products is a function of the level of development in each country.  Alternatively,
the constrained version of (8) using GDP per capita could be interpreted  as capturing the capital labor ratio of each
country.  The constrained  specification  yields results within one standard deviation of those reported later in Table 6.
10direct payments (DS6), other product-specific  support (DS7), and any support measured via the
Equivalent Measurement of Support methodology (DS8). Finally, where relevant,  a total figure
for non-product-specific  support is also given (DS9).1 8
Two problems with the estimation of equation (8)  are (i) that transport costs are not
directly observable  and (ii) that we cannot retrieve the elasticity of import demand and export
supply with respect to domestic support, but only its sum. Assumrting that transport costs to the
world market are equal for exporters  and importers, these costs can be proxied by the ratio of
export and import unit values. As long as the measurement  error in unit prices is identical for
exports and imports the problems described above are addressed. As regards the second issue, we
assume that elasticities of import demand and export supply with respect to domestic support are
equal. 19
5  Results
We first focus on the estimation of the price and domestic support elasticity of export supply and
import demand and then turn into the results of the simulation exercise.
Estimating elasticities
Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of equation (8) using different measures  of domestic
support. In column 1 results are reported using notifications by WTO members of non-exempt
support (this corresponds to categories DS4 to DS9 according to WTO notification procedures).
These are (generally) product specific and include market price support (calculated  according to
the methodology in Annex 3 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture)  and non-exempt
direct payments (denoted  sf
5 4 9 ). Column 2 reports results using: notifications on exempt
domestic support (this corresponds to categories DS 1 to DS3 according to WTO notification
procedures).  These are non-product specific and include measures which WTO)  members have
placed in the "green box", measures that are exempt in developing countries and direct payments
'a CGE analyses are usually based on the PSE data compiled by the OECD, which not only includes price support
measures, but, more importantly,  does not correspond to the typology of measures that are the focus of WTO
negotiations (e.g., production vs. other (decoupled) support. See Dimaranan  (2002) for a noteworthy attempt to map
PSE support data into types of policy measures as a function of the factor of production that is supported.
19 Note that if  the ratio of production to exports  and imports is different, then one should expect different elasticities
of import demand and export supply for a given elasticity of dornestic supply to domestic support. One way to
(partially) reconcile this with our results is to recognize that the change in domestic support will also affect domestic
demand through changes  in domestic  and world prices.  In the estimations,  we test the robustness of our results by
varying the elasticities with respect to domestic support on the demand and supply side.
11under production-limiting programs (the  'blue box'). Such non-product specific  support is
allocated for purposes of estimation across products using the distribution of domestic support
commitments by product (the idea being that exempt  support is likely to be higher in sectors
where non-exempt support is larger following a political-economy  logic). This type of domestic
support is denoted as  5DS13.  Column 3 reports results of the estimation of (8)  with the two types
of domestic  support entering  separately.  Finally, Column 4 reports results using the sum of both
types of support.
Given the unbalanced nature of the data set, we work with a between estimator, using as
observations the average across the four year period for which support data are available,  rather
than the annual data (i.e., the sample  is a cross-section of countries and products).20 The
elasticities are then identified using the cross-country variation for each product.21  Results across
the four specifications generally yield an elasticity of import demand around 1.36-1.45  and an
elasticity of export supply around 0.  19-0.28.  The (sum) of the elasticities of domestic support
varies from almost 0 (in the case of DS 1-3 in column 3) to 0.10 in column 1 (for DS4-9). The
fact that DS 1-3 is insignificant in column 3 may be due to collinearity problems given the
methodology used to construct this variable (i.e.,  general domestic support is distributed across
products using product specific  support commitments).  When both types of domestic  support are
added up in column 4, the (sum) of the elasticity of domestic  support is statistically significant.
To determine whether we should work with the sum of the two types of domestic  support,
we run a non-linear specification of equation (8) to test whether the two types of domestic
support can simply be added up. Results are reported below, with standard errors in
parenthesis:2 2
log(mr)-log(xr)=  0.29+  0.34  log(gdp,)-  0.45  log(popJ)-  0.34  log(1+t  )-
(0.42)  (0.04)**  (0.04)**  (0.05)**
(9)
1.17  log(l +±r-  0.04  log  s DS4-9 + 0.00 s DSI-3
(0.08)**  (0.02)*  (0.00)  c
20 This is also due to the fact that ad-valorem equivalents of specific tariffs have only been estimated for  1999 in
OECD (2000) and Stawowy (2001).
21  Thus, the variation in  import and export prices across countries,  which is explained  by transport cost to the
"world" market, allows us to identify the different elasticities.
22  A "*" indicates statistical significance  at the 5 percent  level; "**"  indicates  significance at the  I percent level.
12Equation (9) suggests that we should drop the general domestic support DS 1-3 from the
estimation,  as the coefficient on sDSI3 is not significantly different from zero.  In the specification
we employ in the simulations below we therefore only include non-exempt domestic support
s 4 - 9 , i.e., we use the results reported in column 1 of Table 6. Thus, the 50 percent reduction in
domestic support used in the simulations pertains only to non-exempt domestic support (as
exempt domestic support does not seem to affect trade flows and therefore should have no-or
little-impact on world prices).23
The estimation in column 1 is done across the 158 HS 6 digit commodities.  We assume
these elasticities to be common across these different products. This is not necessarily the case of
course,  as there may be heterogeneity  across products. Table 7 reports results of the estimation in
column  1 of Table 6 letting the elasticity vary across different groups of products (a seemingly
unrelated regression technique was used to provide standard error estimates to control for a
common explanatory  variable that is omitted from the regression). The first five! columns in
Table 7 report the results for animal products (HS 01 to 04), vegetables,  fruits and nuts (HS 6 to
9), cereals and grains (HS  10 to HS  14), processed food products  (HS  15 to HS 24), and cotton
and other textile fibers (HS 50 to 53).  While the variations in import demand and export supply
elasticities  are quite large, the elasticity with respect to domestic support is similar across sectors
(it varies between -0.07 and -0.16). The product group-specific elasticities are used below as the
base estimates for the simulation exercises. The overall. estimates  in column 1 of Table 6 are
used to test for the robustness of the results.24
As mentioned, because we use the information on cross-country variation to estimate the
different elasticities,  it is assumed that these elasticities  do not vary across countries.  If we were
to relax this constraint,  the solution to the model  in Section 3 would be non-linear.  To determine
the restrictiveness of this assumption we estimated the equation in column  1 of Table 6 for the
developing  countries only. All elasticities are within one standard deviation of the elasticities for
the whole sample (except for the import demand elasticity which is within two standard
deviations).  We then estimated it for the three major users of domestic support separately: the
23  Note that exempt domestic support is generally de-linked from production and is  more likely to affect the
production decision rather than the level of production  as measured when working with trade flows.
4 Note that for Animal products, Cereals and other grains, and Sillk, Cotton & other fibres, the coefficient capturing
the import demand elasticity is  insignificant whereas the difference between the import demand and export supply*
price elasticities  is significant.  In these three cases, we cannot reject the assumption that the export supply elasticity
is zero.  We therefore set the export supply elasticities to zero in  the simulations for these products and calibrate the
import demand  elasticities  accordingly.
13EU, Japan and the United States. The results suggest heterogeneity in the price elasticities  across
countries,  but the imprecision in the parameter  estimates did not allow the hypothesis to be
rejected that they are equal across countries. Estimates of elasticities with respect to domestic
support were relatively homogenous (-0.08 for the EU, -0.12 for Japan and -0.10 for the United
States). Thus, the elasticity of net import demand with respect to domestic support seems to be
relatively small (around 0.1) suggesting a reduction in domestic support across WTO members is
likely to have a small impact on world prices.25
Simulation results
In our baseline simulations we use the estimated coefficients  in Table 7 to calibrate import
demand and export supply in each country. Then changes in export revenue, import revenue, and
welfare following a 50 percent cut in tariffs and domestic support to farmers across all WTO
members are calculated for each country using (6) and (7). We also calculate the change in terms
of trade by weighting the changes in prices by export and import shares in each country.  Recall
that the simulations are done for the 158 tariff lines at the HS 6-digit level for which at least one
country provides domestic support to its farmers. (The overall agricultural universe includes
more than 900 tariff lines at the HS 6-digit level).
Table 8 reports results on the change in export revenue,  the import bill, the terms-of-trade
and welfare for the three broad country groups of a 50 percent tariff reduction or a 50 percent
domestic  support reduction.  Aggregate  product specific and individual country results are
reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. The increase in trade across  all country groups is much
larger for the 50 percent tariff cut than for the reduction in domestic support. Exports of
developing countries (excluding LDCs) increase by $4.2 billion, or 6.7 percent of the initial
export revenue for the 158 product categories (Table  8). LDC exports increase by $116 million
(or 3.7 percent), while industrialized country exports increase by $3.3 billion dollars (4.7
percent). There is also an increase in the import bill following the 50 percent tariff reduction. In
industrial countries the increase in imports is double the increase in exports (due both to an
25 Note that the implicit assumption here  is that domestic support only affects the variable  cost of farmers receiving
the subsidy, as we move along the export supply and import demand functions.  If domestic support affects fixed
costs (or the production  decision), as is probably the case with subsidies that are decoupled  from production,  we
would need to work along the domestic supply function. Data on production  is not available for such a large number
of countries at the disaggregated  level required.  This also suggests that we should be working only with non-exempt
subsidies  (which are generally not decoupled from production).
14expansion in demand and higher world prices).  The increase  in imports in developing and least
developed countries  is roughly equal to the increase in exports.26
In relative  terms many developing countries see a significant  expansion in exports
following  a 50 percent cut in tariffs. Figure  1 plots the impact on exports of a 50 percent cut in
tariffs  (in the vertical axis) and domestic  support (in the horizontal axis)  trade for the  121
developing and least developed countries  in the sample.  The vertical and horizontal  lines indicate
a "zero"  change in exports  due to a cut in tariffs or domestic support, respectively.  The highest
percentage increases in exports are found in the Caribbean  and Central American region
reflecting the specialization of these countries in commodities  such as edible fruits and
vegetables,  processed foods and sugar-the categories that see the largest expansion in demand
in percentage terms (Appendix Table  1).27  Mauritius,  Philippines and Thailand-all developing
countries that are producers of such commodities--also  see increases in exports of over 10
percent.  With a few exceptions such as Congo and Malawi, Afirican countries tend to register
only limited increases in exports.
The increase  in exports following a 50 percent cut in domestic support is a tenth of what
is generated by cutting tariffs (Table 8). Developing country exports increase by $0.5 billion, or
0.8 percent of the  1995-1998  average  level of exports.  LDC exports rise by $64 million (2
percent),  while industrial countries expand exports by $314  million (0.5 percent).  More striking
is the fact that the import bill decreases  in developing  and least developed  countries after a 50
percent cut in domestic support (Figure 2). The reason for this is that world prices increase  after
the cut-import demand functions being relatively elastic, the import bill necessarily decreases.
Welfare  increases in all groups of countries after multilateral tariff rei.orrns  (Table 8). The
increase  in welfare  for developing  countries generated by the 50 percent tariff cut is due  not only
to increased  exports, but to the liberalization that occurs in these countries (and the absence of
domestic support). In contrast, developing countries  as a group would see a small reduction in
welfare  following a cut in domestic support.  The relatively high tariffs that prevail  in many of
these countries explain why the impact in welfare  terms is so different. The potential  negative
implication of a cut in domestic support illustrates the importance of also cutting tariffs.
26 Note that the increase  in exports is not necessarily equal to the increase  in imports at the aggregate level for two
reasons. First, increases  in export and import revenue are measured at customs and therefore include transport cost.
Second, we did not have data for all countries, so it is assumed that the rest-of-the world also adjusts to changes in
world prices.
15In the case of LDCs the ratio of gains is quite different.  Instead of a ten to one ratio of
export gains  due to tariff vs. domestic support cuts, it is only two to one. Moreover,  the
simulations suggest that LDCs will obtain welfare  gains from both types of reform.  These
differences between the two country groups reflects both the LDCs greater 'sensitivity'  in
relative terms to OECD support policies and the pattern of production and trade in the various
products.
There is  substantial  heterogeneity  across countries,  reflecting  differences  in export and
import bundles. Variations  in the levels of tariffs and domestic support across different products
in large trading partners  also partly explain this heterogeneity.  A cut of 50 percent in tariffs
generates  a relatively large increase  in developing  country exports of edible  vegetables,  fruits
and nuts (HS07-08), sugar (HS 17)  preparations of vegetables  and fruits (HS 20-21)  and tobacco
(HS24).  In the case of LDCs, the largest increases occur in meat (HS02), sugar and
miscellaneous  edible preparations (HS2 1) (Appendix Table  1).28
A large number of countries  in the sample see their terrns-of-trade  deteriorate  after a 50
percent tariff cut (Appendix Table  2). This  is also the case  following a 50 percent cut in domestic
support. Figure 3 plots the change in terms of trade following changes  in tariffs and domestic
support.  As before, the vertical  and horizontal lines indicate a "zero" change  in the terms of
trade.  Changes in terms of trade seem to be positively correlated across  the two types of cuts, i.e.,
countries that see their terms of trade increase  after a tariff cut will also see their terms of trade
improve  after a domestic support cut.
The fact that the terms-of-trade deteriorates  does not necessarily imply a reduction in
welfare,  given that countries own reforms will tend to increase welfare.  Nonetheless in a number
of instances welfare does decline.  This is the case  in particular for oil producers  and large net
importers  such as Algeria, Bahrain,  Brunei, Egypt,  Gabon,  Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela.  Any welfare losses are generally much smaller if the experiment is a 50 percent cut
in domestic  support. Figure 4 plots the change in welfare per capita under the tariff cut against
the change  in welfare  per capita under the domestic support cut for the countries  in the sample,
with the horizontal and vertical lines again indicating  a "zero"  change  in welfare.  Thus, countries
in the North East quadrant of Figure 2 see their welfare increase under both types of reforms.
27 To the extent that these countries  enjoy tariff preferences in some products for these products, results may
overstate their gains. But again, preferential access  on paper does not necessarily  mean actual preferences  granted.
Second, these are very small countries that only marginal affect the overall picture for developing countries.
28 Note that here we abstract from sanitary or phyto-sanitary barriers,  as well as other non-tariff barriers  that may
also be hindering trade.
16This includes Mauritius, Fiji,  Belize, Guyana,  Costa Rica, Uruguay, etc. There  are no countries
in the South East quadrant,  suggesting that there is no case where a country increases  its welfare
following a cut in domestic support but sees its welfare reduced under the tariff cut. Losers under
both types of reforms include the large net importers mentioned previously.
Sensitivity  analysis
Given the various assumptions  made with respect to elasticities,  a number of sensitivity analyses
were performed.  We first re-estimated the figures  in Table 8 using the elasticity estimates
provided for the whole sample  in the first column of Table 6 (finstead of the elasticity estimates
by product reported in Table 7). We also re-estimated the numbers of Table 8 using extreme
values (i.e.,  instead of half the estimated  coefficient in Table 8, we use either zero  or the total
value of the estimated coefficient) for the elasticities of domestic support on the import and
export side. Finally, we compared results with the case where only OECD members reduce their
tariffs and domestic support.
Using the elasticities estimated for the whole sample, the increase  in exports after a 50
percent tariff cut is 25 percent lower for developing countries  and  15 percent lower for LDCs.
On the other hand, the increase  in exports  after a 50 percent cut in domestic support  is 25 percent
higher for developing countries, but 20 percent lower in the case of LDCs. T  hus the imbalance in
terms of gains is partly reversed.  However, the qualitative results remain:  the increase in exports
by developing countries is 5 times larger under the 50 percent tariff cut than under the 50 percent
domestic support cut. Similarly, for LDCs the increase in exports under the  50 percent tariff cut
is 2 times larger than under the domestic support cut.  The welfare gains for developing  countries
are positive in the case of tariffs, whereas they suffer welfare  losses when domestic support is
cut. For LDCs the welfare increase  is 50 percent higher under the tariff cut.
As noted earlier, we cannot empirically identify the elasticity of domestic support on
import demand and export supply separately, but only its sum.  To test the sensitivity of our
assumption that the two are equal, we assume that each in turn is zero and that the coefficient
identifies the other one. The estimated changes in export revenue, imports and welfare of a 50
percent tariff cut are not affected by these modifications  (as import demand and export supply
are re-calibrated  accordingly). In the case of a 50 percent cut in domestic  support, the increase in
exports by developing countries is 30 percent higher when we assume that the domestic  support
elasticity of export supply is zero and  80 percent lower when we assume that the domestic
17support elasticity of import demand  is zero.  In terms of developing countries'  welfare,  the loss is
22 percent lower when the elasticity of export supply is zero and 25 percent higher when the
elasticity of import demand is zero. However, the qualitative results remain the same. In the case
of LDCs, the estimated change  in exports  is only marginally affected under both scenarios.
We  also  ran  a  scenario  where  the  50  percent  cut  in  tariffs  and  domestic  support  is
undertaken  only by OECD countries.  In the case of domestic  support,  the increase  in exports  of
developing  countries  is  only  3 percent  lower,  which  suggests  that  for  non-LDC  developing
countries almost all the action from the reduction in domestic  support comes from actions by the
OECD.  However,  the  increase  in  exports  is  25  percent  lower  for  LDCs.  This  suggests  that
domestic  support in other developing  countries affect LDC exports to  a larger extent than other
developing  countries.  This is  also the case for tariff cuts. When  OECD countries cut their tariffs
by 50 percent,  the increase  in LDC exports is only 30 percent of the increase  in exports when all
WTO members reduce their tariffs by 50 percent. For other developing countries, the increase  in
exports  under an  OECD tariff cut  is only half of the  $4.2 billion  generated  if all WTO  members
reduce  their  tariffs  by  50  percent.  These  results  illustrate  the  importance  of more  general
liberalization  of trade in the commodities concerned.
6  Conclusions
As is  the case  for tariff peaks-see Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002)-we  find that LDCs are
disproportionately  affected by agricultural support policies. Reducing such support is therefore
important. However,  tariffs matter a lot more than subsidies  in terms of their impact on world
prices. The positive welfare effect of reducing tariffs onproducts that are also affected  by
agricultural  support is a multiple of what can be achieved  from an equivalent percentage  cut in
domestic  support only-tariff reductions  generate  welfare gains that are a multiple of what can
be obtained  from reductions  in support policies.  This not only reflects the high tariff peaks in
OECD countries, but the fact that developing countries use tariffs to protect domestic production.
These countries generally have low levels of domestic  support, reflecting  both budget constraints
and a more neutral policy stance in terms of supporting this sector of the economy.
Our analysis suggests the primary focus of attention should therefore be on reducing
border protection in both OECD and developing  countries. The negotiating challenge is how to
achieve this. For developing countries tariffs are an important-indeed  often the only-
instrument of intervention that they have available  to respond to the effects  of OECD subsidy
18policies. An important dimension of agricultural support policies that has been ignored in this
paper-the  impact on price volatility-plays  a major role here (Valdes and Foster, 2002).  Tariff
protection can shelter farmers  from import surges in periods  where world prices  drop
significantly.  Whatever the source of the exogenous  shock that drives prices  down, much of the
adjustment may fall disproportionately on residual (non-OECD) markets because  support
policies shelter OECD farmers from  the shock.  Unilateral  liberalization of agricultural trade in
countries such as India proved to be politically umsustainable  as farmers  were subjected to large
world price swings and import surges of subsidized commodities (Gulati  and Narayanan,  2002).
Further agricultural trade liberalization in developing countries may be significantly impeded in
an environment that is characterized  by continued large-scale  support for OECD farmers.
Substantial reduction in OECD agricultural support policies is therefore  important not only
because it generates  direct benefits for the many developing  economies that are net exporters,  it
is critical to create the political  support to induce (allow) developing country governments to
continue to pursue welfare improving domestic agricultural trade policy reforms. Thus,
reductions in production subsidies in OECD cotntries  are necessary,  although not sufficient,  for
developing countries  to reap significant gains from the current WTO negotiations on agriculture.
At the same time,  as noted by Anderson (2002), if OECD members were to move on the subsidy
front,  it is important that developing countries reduce protection.  Without own liberalization  the
negative welfare  effects for countries that experience terms of trade losses would likely be
greater.
The fact that our simulations suggest that a number of countries  are predicted to lose
from reforms suggests liberalization  and removal of domestic support should be accompanied  by
compensation mechanisms, which could include additional  'aid for trade'  (Hoekman, 2002). Any
negotiated reforms will only be implemented gradually, allowing for measures to support
adjustment.  Such measures should include actions  that improve the functioning of input,
downstream  and factor markets to support efforts by farmers to expand output in response to a
rise in prices  (Anderson and Hoekman, 2000). Measures  to ieduce costs for farmers are
particularly important.  Examples include  action  to improve the efficiency of services-finance,
insurance, transport,  storage, packaging,  etc. The cost-increasing  effect of inefficient services can
be substantial-as illustrated in recent research on transport services  (Fink et al. 2002; Francois
and Wooton,  2001). Indeed, if such accompanying measures  are taken, the resulting supply
19response may cause some countries to shift from net importer to net exporter status, attenuating
the magnitude of the negative effects estimated  above (Anderson, 2002).
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that our analysis has been limited to only a few-
the subsidized-commodities.  The Doha negotiations span all trade,  including non-subsidized
agricultural products and manufactures. The overall welfare numbers generated by our analysis
are therefore not particularly relevant,  except to indicate that the countries that lose from reforms
that affect the subsidized subr set of agricultural  products will need to identify other areas in
which they  can generate offsetting gains. In principle this should be feasible given the large
negotiation  set that was established in Doha.
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22Table 1: Total Domestic Support Notifications to WTO by Income Country Group, 1995-98  ($ million)
Green box (exempt)  la  Domestic support lb  Total (DSI-DS9) lalb
Country/Group  /c  1995  1996  1997  199f  1995  1996  1997  1991  1995  1996  1997  1998
ndustrial Countries (23)  145069  139650  77971  473  119094  114118  37725  398(  264163253767  115696  8711
f which:
Canada  1529  1463  1482  5306  3011  6769
European  Union (15)  51833  55360  66743  65905  118577 121265
apan  33691  25905  21919  37686  30952  26544  71377  56858  48464
Norway  1771  1762  1562  156  1559  1645  1505  145  3329  3407  3068  301
Switzerland  2299  2404  2121  219  3625  2964  2374  225  5924  5368  4494  444.
United States  53071  51825  51249  7699  7074  7050  (  60770  58899  58299
Developing Countries  (81)  21484  18468  17439  720  16418  7269  13279  10971  37902  25737  30718  1817
of which:
Brazil  5241  2872  3739  295  363  307  5536  3235  4046
Colombia  450  719  426  58  4  14  508  723  441
Israel  292  414  338  533  559  554  825  973  892
Korea  5200  6481  6133  385  3057  2872  2711  167  8257  9353  8844  5532
Poland  436  549  878  851  254  227  292  30  691  776  1170  1154
South Africa  763  525  544  617  654  542  1380  1179  1086
Thailand  1568  2106  1738  116C1  633  510  534  397  2202  2616  2272  1556
Venezuela  730  657  675  3064  794  1054  3793  1450  1730
Least Developed Countries  (30)  12  112  3  61  0  0  0  12  112  3  61
All countries  166565 158230  95413  11999  135512  121387  51004  14951  302077279617 146417  26950
Memo: As % of total share
Industrial Countries  (23)  87.1  88.3  81.7  39.  87.9  9A.0  740  26.  87.4  90.8  79.0  32.
Developing Countries (81)  12.9  11.7  18.3  60.  12.1  6.0  26.0  73.  12.5  9.2  21.0  67.
east  Developed Countries (30)  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.'  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0. 
Notes:
/a Green box, measures that are  exempt for developing countries and policies covered  by production-limiting programs  (WTO categories DS1,DS2,DS3).
/b Comprises WTO categories DS4 to DS9-4ncludes  price support.  See text for discussion and  description.
/c Number  of countries  reported  in the parentheses.  A total of  120 countries notified to WTO  during  1995-98
Source:  Based  on WTO document  G/AG/NG/S/1.
23Table 2:  Commitments and Average  Direct Domestic  Support Levels, 1995-98
Direct Support ($ mil)  As % of Total (in %)
HS-2  Product  Commitment  1995-98  ommitment  1995-98
01  Live animals.  250  63  0.1  0.1
02  Meat and edible meat offal  60155  14907  22.3  18.5
04  Dairy prod;  birds' eggs; honey  39372  11557  14.6  14.3
06 Live tree  & other plant;  bulb, cut flowers  0  14  0.0  0.0
07 Edible vegetables  and roots & tubers  10326  397  3.8  4.9
08 Edible fruit and  nuts; melons  7879  3474  2.9  4.3
09 Coffee, tea, mat and spices  1272  50  0.5  0.1
10 Cereals.  104109  27953  38.5  34.6
11  Milled  products; malt; starches  421  142  0.2  0.2
12  Oil seed,  oleaginous fruits  8577  447  3.2  0.6
13  Lac; gums,  resins & other vegetables  0  0  0.0  0.0
15 Animal/vegetable  fats & oils & prod  1899  105C  0.7  1.3
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery  12370  5304  4.6  6.6
18 Cocoa  and cocoa preparations  16  0.0  0.0
0  Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts  prod  892  52S  0.3  0.7
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations  0  0.0  0.0
22 Beverages,  spirits and  vinegar  4306  1172  1.6  1.5
23 Residues & waste from  food industry  382  192  0.1  0.2
24 Tobacco and manufactured  2662  735  1.0  0.9
0  Silk.  416  14  0.2  0.0
51  Wool, fine/coarse animal hair nest  124  17  0.0  0.0
52 Cotton.  3411  655  1.3  0.8
53 Other vegetable textile fibers & yarns  34  71  0.0  0.1
98  Non-product specific  11276  8392  4.2  10.4
Total Above Agricultural  Products  270151  80714  100.0  100.0
Note:  Direct domestic support  is defined as the sum  of WTO  DS4-9 categories.  See text.
Source:  Based  on WTO document  G/AG/NG/S/1.
24Table 3: Average  MFN Tariff on Products Benefiting from Domestic Support
(including ad valorem equivalent of slpecific tariffs)
MFN Appliedl  Tariff  Maximum  Rate
Countries  Average  1995-98  (%)  Average  1995-98 (%)
Developed Countries
Australia  1  7
anada  30  1403
EC15  22  219
celand  9  61
apan  51  865
ew Zealand  1  10
orway  19  555
nited States  14  121
Developing  Countries  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
AIbania  14  30
AIgeria  24  45
ntigua and Bar  27  40
Argentina  9  21
ahrain  7  120
arbados  22  40
elize  24  40
olivia  10  10
razil  9  33
ameroon  23  30
hile  11  1I
hina  28  114
olombia  14  20
Congo, Rep.  21  30
osta Rica  13  103
ote d'lvoire  17  35
uba  9  30
zech Republic  I  1  124
Dominica  22  40
Dominican  Republic  17  35
Ecuador  13  20
gypt, Arab Rep  31  1050
I Salvador  13  25
Gabon  23  30
Ghana  19  25
Grenada  20  40
Guatemala  12  20
uyana  25  100
onduras  14  30
Hungary  30  85
ndia  28  185
ndonesia  13  104
ran, Islamic R  3  15
srael  4  22
amaica  25  40
Jordan  23  180
Kenya  22  50
Korea,  Rep.  46  284
Latvia  10  45
ithuania  8  71
alaysia  8  257
Malta  3  40
Mauritius  20  80
Mexico  15  171
orocco  45  362
Nicaragua  8  38
Nigeria  27  75
25MF N Applied Tariff  Maximum Rate
Countries  Average  1995-98  (%)  Average  1995-98 (%)
Oman  2  5
akistan  36  70
Panama  11  50
apua New Guinea  38  85
araguay  9  25
eru  16  25
hilippines  22  58
oland  14  44
Romania  21  144
Russian Federation  9  25
Rwanda  25  100
Saudi Arabia  I1  65
lovenia  9  49
outh Africa  7  55
ri Lanka  33  60
t. Kitts and N  21  40
t. Lucia  22  40
Suriname  22  50
Taiwan, China  18  50
Thailand  41  65
Trinidad and Tobago  20  40
Tunisia  33  43
Turkey  28  145
ruguay  10  24
Venezuela  13  20
Zimbabwe  26  68
Least Developed  Countries
Bangladesh  40  300
Burkina Faso  21  37
Central African  20  30
Chad  22  30
\4adagascar  7.5  20
Malawi  18  45
Maldives  16  50
Mali  19  30
Mozambique  15  35
olomon Islands  40  100
Sudan  8  30
Tanzania  29  40
Uganda  13  36
Zambia  17  25
Memo:
All Above Countries  18  1403
ndustrial Countries  19  1403
Developing Countries  (non-LDC)  17  1050
Least Developed  Countries  20  300
Note: Countries with zero tariffs not reported (Brunei, Estonia, Hong Kong, Kyrgyz, Rep.  Singapore)
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS  tariff data (through WITS), OECD (2000) and Stawowy (2001).
26Table 4: Average MFN Tariff on Products with Domestic  Support
Average  Maximum
HS-2  Product  1995-98 (%)  1995-98 (%)
01  Live animals.  11.6  555.0
02 Meat and edible meat offal  2'1.0  361.5
04 Dairy prod;  birds' eggs; honey  29.4  349.5
06 Live tree & other plant;  bulb, cut flowers  16.2  249.0
07 Edible vegetables and  roots & tubers  24.0  865.4
08 Edible fruit and  nuts; melons  20.0  238.9
09 Coffee, tea, mat and spices  16.7  559.3
10 Cereals.  21.8  719.1
11  Milled products;  malt; starches  31.1  1402.8
12 Oil seed,  oleaginous fruits  11.2  686.0
13  Lac; gums, resins & other vegetables  10.8  65.0
15 Animal/vegetable fats & oils & prod  15.3  188.0
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  26.6  209.0
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations  9.0  55.0
20  Prep of vegetable,  fruit, nuts prod  23.0  162.8
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations  32.1  302.4
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar  36.7  1050.0
23 Residues & waste from food industry  7.1  45.0
24 Tobacco and manufactured  20.1  257.3
50 Silk.  23.4  235.8
51  Wool,  fine/coarse animal hair  6.3  54.9
52 Cotton.  5.2  35.3
53 Other vegetable textile fibres & yarns  5.9  52.5
Total (all items with positive domestic support)  18.4  1402
Memo:
All Agricultural Products  19.8  1772
Source:  UNCTAD  TRAINS tariff data (through WITS),  OECD  (2000) and Swawoy (2001).
27Table 5: Trade  in Domestically Supported  Agricultural Products by Country, 1995-98
Imports of  Exports of
Exports of goods  goods  goods  Imports of goods
supported by WTO  supported in  supported  by  supported in WTO
Country  members  WTO  WTO members  members
($m)  members($m)  as % of  as % of
(No. of countries)  Ave 1995-98  Ave  1995-98  All Exports  All Imports
Albania  24  74  8.8  8.2
Algeria  5  1902  0.0  20.0
Angola  12  139  0.3  7.2
Antigua and Barbuda  3  9  6.0  2.8
rgentina  6251  603  25.6  2.3
Australia  9384  843  17.0  1.4
Bahrain  2  71  0.1  3.7
Bangladesh  90  805  2.2  12.7
Barbados  46  40  21.9  5.9
Belize  70  16  46.6  5.9
Benin  230  57  84.7  5.9
Bolivia  137  95  11.3  5.2
Brazil  6494  3968  13.1  6.7
Brunei  1  56  0.0  1.8
Bulgaria  333  276  6.9  5.4
Burkina  Faso  130  35  75.5  7.9
Burundi  76  19  72.8  10.9
Cameroon  422  114  24.7  8.6
Canada  7023  3918  3.4  2.1
entral African  Rep.  48  5  24.8  4.4
Chad  109  5  82.5  3.5
Chile  2225  542  14.2  3.2
China  3243  5471  1.9  4.0
Colombia  3460  1031  32.0  7.2
Comoros  0  13  0.1  24.3
Congo, Dem.  Rep  147  76  10.6  8.6
Congo, Rep.  21  35  1.1  3.9
Costa  Rica  1361  257  37.5  5.9
Cote d'lvoire  1835  299  48.7  11.0
Croatia  101  411  2.2  5.0
Cuba  745  337  50.7  13.4
Cyprus  115  160  24.5  4.2
Czech Republic  443  1001  1.9  3.6
Djibouti  3  34  9.5  9.9
Dominica  21  7  57.7  7.1
Dominican  Repub.  469  414  10.2  7.4
Ecuador  1457  258  31.2  5.7
EEC15  17375  38075  2.2  4.9
Egypt, Arab  Rep  387  2319  11.0  17.1
El  Salvador  485  236  42.0  8.3
Estonia  158  237  6.3  6.3
Fiji  222  46  37.9  6.5
Gabon  2  43  0.1  4.9
Gambia, The  2  41  11.0  17.5
Ghana  494  115  32.4  4.7
Grenada  4  12  14.5  7.2
Guatemala  1081  271  48.6  7.2
Guinea  38  99  7.8  19.1
Guinea-Bissau  31  4  39.8  4.2
28Imports of  Exports of
Exports of goods  goods  goods,  Imports of goods
. supported  by WTO  supported  in  supported by  supported in WTO
Country  members  WTO . WTO  members  members
($m)  members($m)  as % of  as % of
(No. of countries)  Ave 1995-98  Ave 1995-98  All Exports  All Imports
Guyana  182  27  33.1  6.7
Haiti  29  127  12.2  14.9
Honduras  385  194  43.9  9.0
Hong Kong, China  22  2964  0.1  1.5
Hungary  955  455  5.6  2.3
Iceland  148  54  7.9  2.6
India  2782  964  8.4  2.4
Indonesia  1394  3396  2.8  8.9
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  163  1102  1.0  10.3
Israel  876  938  4.1  3.3
amaica  229  136  12.1  5.5
apan  312  15850  0.1  4.9
Jordan  53  397  6.2  12.3
Kazakhstan  0  0  0.0  0.0
Kenya  790  210  48.7  8.4
Korea,  Rep.  400  4727  0.3  3.6
Kuwait  4  277  0.0  4.0
Kyrgyz Republic  83  24  24.1  4.7
Latvia  32  143  2.0  5.7
Lithuania  227  244  6.7  5.0
Macao  6  51  0.3  2.5
Madagascar  77  45  26.6  7.8
Malawi  361  17  75.7  4 4
Malaysia  354  2457  0.5  3.4
Maldives  1  26  2.1  8.3
Mali  255  35  84.5  5.8
Malta  20  81  1.2  3.0
Mauritania  4  72  0.7  13.8
Mauritius  401  185  24.6  8.5
Mexico  3066  4317  3.0  4.3
Mongolia  48  10  12.0  2.2
Morocco  481  1204  9.0  13.8
Mozambique  0  0  0.0  0.0
Myanmar  284  27  23.6  1.0
New Zealand  3194  412  24.1  3.0
Nicaragua  239  110  40.0  8.7
Niger  34  48  17.2  12.9
Nigeria  277  431  1.8  7.5
Norway  116  980  0.3  2.8
Oman  45  281  0.7  5.8
Pakistan  536  543  7.0  6.7
Panama  244  . 121  38.8  4.1
Papua New Guinea  351  36  15.1  2.6
Paraguay  568  109  55.1  3.5
Peru  1144  778  19.3  9.6
Philippines  1468  1388  5.6  4.5
Poland  672  1917  2.7  4.9
Qatar  1  64  0.0  2.3
Romania  403  424  4.9  3.8
Russian Federation  931  3227  1.4  6.9
Rwanda  42  40  59.0  18.2
29Imports of  Exports of
Exports of goods  goods  goods  Imports of goods
supported by WTO  supported  in  supported  by  supported in WTO
Country  members  WTO  WTO members  members
($m)  members($m)  as % of  as % of
(No.  of countries)  Ave 1995-98  Ave 1995-98  All Exports  All Imports
Saudi Arabia  77  2045  0.1  6.3
Senegal  44  221  7.6  16.1
Sierra  Leone  12  17  6.6  8.7
Singapore  677  1449  0.6  1.2
Slovak Republic  197  332  2.1  3.0
Slovenia  79  343  0.9  3.6
Solomon  Islands  20  2  9.1  1.7
South  Africa  1496  902  6.4  3.2
ri Lanka  81  405  2.1  9.1
St. Kitts  and Nevis  14  6  77.5  5.6
St. Lucia  45  17  63.8  5.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines  28  13  57.3  10.5
Sudan  290  127  60.1  8.6
Suriname  46  23  11.6  5.5
Switzerland  398  2496  0.5  3.2
aiwan  247  3820  0.2  3.6
Tanzania  448  63  67.8  5.0
Thailand  3938  1715  7.0  2.8
Togo  103  40  42.5  6.3
Trinidad  and Tobago  50  160  2.1  6.4
Tunisia  223  553  4.0  6.9
Turkey  2565  2147  10.5  5.0
Uganda  349  73  63.3  7.5
United Arab Emirates  225  782  1.0  3.1
United States  31450  15475  5.2  1.8
Uruguay  575  211  23.0  6.2
Venezuela  171  938  0.8  8.0
Zambia  76  30  8.1  4.0
Zimbabwe  1057  61  59.3  3.0
Memo:
All above countries (143)  136483  151021  3.6  3.7
Industrial Countries  (23)  69400  78103  3.1  3.3
Developing  Countries (90)  63781  70616  4.2  4.2
Least Developed  Countries (30)  3302  2302  17.8  8.9
Source:  Based on UN  COMTRADE  Statistics.
30Table 6: Estimates of price and domestic suipport elasticities a
(1)  1  (2)  -F  (3)  (4)
log(GDP)  0.26  0.24  0.26  0.24
(0.03)**  (0.03)**  (0.03)**  (0.03)**
log(Pop)  -0.35  -0.33  -0.35  -0.33
(0.03)**  (0.03)**  (Cl.03)**  (0.04)**
log(1 + t)  -1.36  -1.46  -1.37  -1.42
-(d  )  (0.27)**  (0.31)**  (Cl.27)**  (0.31)**
log(l + r)  -1.17  -1.17  -1.17  -1.17
_ (ed  _  g s)  (0.08)**  (0.08)**  (Cl.08)**  (0.08)**
log(s DS 4 9)  -0.10  -0.10
-( 2 d +  V)  (0.02)**  ((1.03)**
log(SDSI 3 )  -0.05  -0.00
_(id +,V)  (0.02)**  (0.03)
og(s DSI-3  + s DS4-9)  -0.06
-(2d  +V)  (0.02)**
Product dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R d  0.136  0.135  0.136  0.135
#ot  observations  7610  7610  7610  7610
#HS  6-digit lines  158  158  158  _  158
Estimation procedure is OLS.  Standard errors in parenthesis are White Robust. "**" Significant at the  I percent
level.  "*" significant at the 5 percent level.
31Table 7: Estimates of price and domestic support elasticities  by group of products'
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
HS 01 to 04  HS 06 to 09  HS 10 to 14  HS 15 to 24  HS 50 to 53
Animal  Vegetables,  Cereals&  Food process.  Silk, cotton
products  fruits&nuts  other grains  products  &other fibres
log(GDP)  -0.21  0.51  0.10  0.18  0.56
(0.08)**  (0.05)**  (0.06)  (0.06)**  (0.16)**
log(Pop)  0.14  -0.67  -0.18  -0.20  -0.19
(0.09)  (0.05)**  (0.07)*  (0.07)**  (0.17)
log(1  + t)  -0.70  -2.16  0.06  -2.35  -0.44
_  (E_d  )  (0.51)  (0.53)**  (0.62)  (0.53)**  (2.74)
log(l + r)  -0.86  -1.12  -1.25  -1.44  -0.98
_ (ed _ 6A)  (0.18)**  (0.13)**  (0.14)**  (0.20)**  (0.42)*
log(s DS 4-9)  -0.07  -0.11  -0.07  -0.16  -0.11
_ (id  +V  *  )(0.05)  (0.04)*  (0.04)  (0.05)**  (0.10)
Product dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  T  Yes  T  Yes
R2d  0.104  0.164  0.164  0.109  0.09
#otobservations  1128  3028  1698  1448  308
# HS 6-dig lines  28  55  38  27  10
a Estimation using Seemingly  Unrelated Regression  procedure.  Group specific elasticities estimated using the
information  in the whole sample,  letting the elasticities vary by group of products.  Standard errors  in parenthesis  are
White  Robust. "**"  significant at the I percent level; "*" significant at the 5 percent level.
32Table 8: Impact of a 50 percent cut in tariffs and domestic support (DS) (158 products)
Tariff cut  Cut in DS  Change in welfare
untry group  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Tariff cut  DS cut
exports  imports  exports  imports
($ mil)  ($ mil)  (  mil)  ($ mil)  (  mil)  ($ mil)
lustrial Countries  3,262  7677  314  121  14,464  541
veloping Countries  4,146  4136  504  -92  2,293  -273
ast Developed  Countries  116  118  64  -4  52  36
(percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  ($ per capita)  ($per capita)
lustrial Countries  4.7  9.8  0.5  0.2  18.37  0.69
veloping  Countries  6.7  6.0  0.8  -0.1  0.56  -0.07
ast Developed  Countries  3.7  5.3  2.0  -0.2  0.12  0.08
33Figure 1: Changes in Exports by Country
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Figure 2: Changes in Imports by Country
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34Figure 3: Changes in the Terms of Trade
(50% tariff cut vs. 50% cut in domestic support)
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C  mar~~~~~~~~3Annex:  Data Sources
All trade data are from UN Comtrade Database (both value figures and unit prices).  When
countries did not report trade data to Comtrade we mirror their data using notifications by their
trading partners.  Tariffs are drawn from the UNCTAD and WTO as provided in
UNCTAD/World  Bank World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) system.  This database does not
include the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. For ad-valorem equivalents  of specific
tariffs we rely on Stawowy (2001)  for estimates for Canada, the European Union, Japan and the
United States and OECD (2000) for other OECD countries.  In cases where tariff quotas are used,
tariff rates  generally comprise the average of in and out of quota tariffs is generally taken,
although in some cases only the out of quota tariff is available. The OECD ad-valorem
equivalents  of specific tariffs use exclusively out of quota tariffs.  We do not have quota
information, this may bias results some estimates as some import prices may be higher if
exporters benefit from in-quota lower tariffs.
As mentioned in the text, the source of domestic support data is the WTO (document
G/AG/NG/S/1).  This data comes in national currency and was transformed into US dollars using
the period  average exchange  rate reported in the IMF IFS. The product classification in each
country notification is arbitrary and therefore we filter the product classification into the
Harmonized  System 6 digit classification.  In most cases this can be done through a one-to-one
mapping. In some cases, the domestic support reported covers several  6 digit tariff lines, in
which case the subsidy was distributed across the relevant tariff lines using the share of the
reporting country's exports as weights.  The concordance file is available from the authors on
request.
As exempt subsidies are not product specific, these were also mapped into a product
specific subsidies using as weights the product-specific  commitments that each country made in
the Uruguay Round. Non-product specific support is divided evenly into all products exported by
the country concerned.  All products shown  in notifications  to the WTO are included, whether or
not the support is below the de minimis level for the member concerned.  Thus, total AMS  may
exceed total WTO commitments for a country.  GDP (in US dollars) and population data are
drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database.
36Appendix Table  1: Impact of tariff and domestic support cuts by group of products
Change  in  Change  in  Change in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in
exports  imports  exports  imports  exports  imiports  exports  imports
with 50  with 50  with 50  with 50  with SO  with 50  with 50  with 50
percent  percent  percent  percent  percent  percent  percent  percent
HS 2 digit  tariff cut  tariff cut  cut in  DS  cut in DS  tariff cut  tariffecut  cut in  DS  cut in  DS
products  (S'000)  (S'000)  (S-000)  (S'000)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)
A. Impact on developing  countries (non-LDCs):
01  Live animals.  26116  21278  -9165  1035  4.8  2 1  -0 2  0.1
02 Meat and edible meat offal  31104  40741  4569)  2526  4.7  4.4  0.7  0.3
04 Dairy prod; birds' eggs;  honey  157823  338591  25782  32685  8.5  5.7  1,4  0 5
06 Live tree &other plant; bulb  28293  26664  24664  -2178  2.1  7.3  1.8  -0.6
07 Edible vegetables and roots  442019  169647  22424  -3387  10.1  6.3  0.5  -0.  1
Og  Edible fruit  and nuts; melons  1138841  234312  10669 2  -34114  12.3  4.9  1.2  -0.7
09 Coffee, tea,  mat and spices  110458  116167  -32060  -6439  1.2  7.6  -0.3  -0.4
1  0  Cereals  353031  1739555  126545  -40021  3.9  7.6  1.4  -0.2
1  1 Milled products;  malt; starches  25671  57062  86  511  9.6  5.8  0.0  0.l
12 Oil  seed, oleaginous flruits;  87943  501554  46149  3421  1.9  7.9  1.0  0.1
13  Lac; gums, resins &  other veg  43  3176  0  1  3.3  4.0  0.0  0 0
15  Animal/veg fats &  oils &  prod  195152  122296  6290  -2105  7.3  6.2  0.2  -0 1
17  Sugars and  sugar confectionery  693521  131776  9157  -18079  14.3  4.8  0.2  -0.7
8  Cocoa  and cocoa preparations  15787  22191  93  57  0.6  3.8  0.0  0.0
20  Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts  196982  72345  25567  -7897  13.8  9.4  1.8  -1.0
21  Miscellaneous  edible prep.  246069  59568  -117)  3008  18.7  2.3  0.0  0.1
22 Beverages, spirits  and  vinegar  32659  76229  13423  -5818  4.4  14.0  1.8  -1.1
23  Residues  from food industry  2  61389  -7552,  -15189  0.0  4.0  -0.5  -1 0
24 Tobacco and manufactured  329093  2211ISO  53926  -30836  11.6  10.5  1  9  -1.5
50 Silk.  6574  503  975  116  23.7  5.3  3.5  1.2
51  Wool,- fine/coarse animal hair  6425  30319  1954  69  1.6  2.7  0.5  0.0
52 Cotton.  21523  83998  76658  30440  1.1  1  2  3  8  0.4
53 Other  vegetable textile fibres  409  5330  134  189  1.3  4.4  0.4  0.2
B. Impact on  LDCs:
01 Live animals.  3593  204  57  6  4.8  1.7  0.1  0.1
02 Meat and edible meat offal  ,  3188  203  26  2  19.2  1.0  0.2  0.0
04 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; honey  252  11101  47  489  7.5  4.9  1.4  0.2
06 Live tree &  other plant; bulb  432  68  616  -4  2.4  5.0  3.4  -0.3
07 Edible vegetables  and roots  18426  17035  1035  -108  7.4  12.6  0.4  -0.  1
08  Edible fruit and  nuts; melons  1835  8184  417  -191  1.5  24.1  0.3  -0.6
09 Coffee,  tea,  mat and spices  7561  973  6809  -61  1.1  2.2  1.0  -0.1I
10 Cereals.  3234  31639  1603  -2247  3.4  3.0  1.7  -0.2
1  1 Milled products; malt; starches  . 38  815  0  -1  9.0  1.9  0.1  0 0
12 Oil  seed, oleaginous fruits;  13423  10066  274  -285  6.0  12.4  0.1  -0.4
13  Lac; gums, resins &other  veg  10  30  0  0  3.3  0.9  0.0  0.0
15 Animal/veg fats &oils &prod  368  1490  8  -46  7.3  3.3  0.2  -0.1I
I17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  14042  17677  1373  . -652  14.4  12.6  1.4  -0.5
1  8 Cocoa and  cocoa preparations  278  0  3  0  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0
20 Prep of vegetable,  fruit, nuts  99  302  40  -25  7.1  2.4  2.8  -0.2
21  Miscellaneous  edible prep.  379  1814  4  -28  18.7  3.7  0.2  -0.  1
22 Beverages,  spirits and vinegar  12  .362  5  -18  4.4  3.0  1.8  -0.  1
23  Residues  from  food industry  0  114  127  -20  0.0  4.8  1.5  -0.8
24 Tobacco and manufactured  33855  4485  11518  -559  8.9  8.4  3.0  -1.1
50OSilk.  2  1  0  0  23.7  0.5  3.5  0.1
51  Wool, fine/coarse animal hair  0  0  1  0  0.8  0.0  1.0  0.0
52 Coton.  10712  11036  39801  135  1.1  5.2  3.9  0.1
53  Other vegetable  textile fibres  4223  12  650  0  4.5  1.3  0.7  0.0
37Appendix Table 2: Impact of a 50 percent cut in tariffs and domestic  support (%)
50%  tariff cut  50% DS cut  Change in terms of trade  Change  in welfare
50%  50%
Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  50%  50 percent  tariff cut  cut in DS
Country  export  rev.  import rev,  export  rev,  import rev,  tariff cut  cut in  DS  S  per capita)  (  per capita)
Albania  8.5  7.0  1.2  -0 5  -2.8  -0.6  -0.4  -0 1
Algeria  6.5  5.9  1.2  -0.2  -4.5  -1.4  -2.1  -0.9
Angola  1.0  0.0  11  0.0  -44  -0.7  0.0  0.0
Antigua and Barbuda  6.8  12.6  1.8  -0.3  -1.2  0.2  1.3  0.9
Argentina  4.6  4.5  1.5  -0.5  2.4  1.2  4.9  2.4
Australia  4.8  -3.5  1.0  -0.4  3.1  1.2  17.5  6.5
Bahrain  4.3  2.8  1.2  -0.  1  -4.9  -0.6  -4.4  -0.6
Bangladesh  5.0  12.0  08  -0.3  -3.2  -I  7  0.0  -0.1I
Barbados  14.4  6.7  1.2  -0.3  1.5  -0 3  7.1  -0.5
Belize  16.9  5.1  1.6  -0.  1  5.6  0.5  25 5  20
Benin  1.2  0.0  3.4  0.0  -0.2  2.4  04  1  3
Bolivia  2.4  4.2  2.2  -0.4  -1.0  0 7  -0.2  0.2
Brazil  4.7  4.4  -0 5  06  0.0  0 I  0.1  0.1
Brunei  55  -1.7  2.5  -0 3  -4.5  -1.1  -7 0  -1.8
Bulgaria  7.1  0.0  1.4  0.0  03  -0.2  1.8  0.4
Burkina Faso  3.8  3.5  3.3  -0.2  0.8  2.3  0.3  0.4
Burundi  14  0.0  1.0  0.0  -1.1  0.2  0 1  0 1
Cameroon  4.3  6.7  1.5  -0 3  0.4  0.7  03  0.3
Canada  3.9  11.3  1.0  -0.5  0.8  0.8  26.9  2.9
Central  African  Rep.  3.3  4.0  2.3  -0.3  0.8  1.7  0.2  03
Chad  1.1  8.1  39  0.0  0.8  3.7  0.1  0.6
Chile  4.7  4.9  1.3  -0.3  12  0.2  26  05
China  5.7  18.1  1  2  -0.4  -0.3  -0.9  0.5  0.0
Colombia  5.7  6.9  -0 9  0.7  1.4  0.2  1.8  0.3
Comoros  6.1  0.0  1.0  0.0  -7 3  -1 2
Congo,  Dem.  Rep  1.5  0.0  1.0  0.0  -1.1  -0.1I  0.0  0.0
Congo,  Rep.  9.3  5.6  1.3  -0.3  -1.3  -0 3  -0.1I  0.0
Costa Rica  14 6  3.8  1.7  -0.5  5.8  0.5  28.4  22
Cote dIlvoire  1.9  7.0  0.6  -0.4  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.3
Croatia  7.2  0.0  1.5  0.0  -2.6  -0 6  1.0  0.3
Cuba  13.8  2.3  1.4  -0.2  3.1  0.0  3.4  0.0
Cyprus  7.1  0.0  0.1  0.  -0.4  -0 7  5.7  0.4
Czech Republic  7.0  1.7  0.9  -0.4  -0.6  -0.4  -0.3  -0.5
Djibouti  4.9  0.0  0.5  0.0  -3.9  -0.7  0.4  0.0
Dominica  22.6  8.2  2.1  0.1  6.8  05  26.9  1.9
Dominican Rep.  10.0  3.2  1.4  -0.6  0.1  -0.2  0.7  -0.2
EECl15  6.9  9.3  -0.3  0.7  -0.8  -0 4  13.9  -0.2
Ecuador  18.5  50  2.1  -0.4  7.4  07  II  5  1.1
Egypt,  Arab Rep  4.6  1.3  2.0  -0.4  -2.6  -1 0  -0.9  -0.4
El Salvador  3.4  4.5  1.0  -0.2  -0  1  -0.2  0.1  -0.2
Estonia  5.9  -1.3  1.2  -0.1I  0.1  -0.3  06  -0 8
Fiji  13.8  0.0  1.3  0.0  4.0  0.3  15.4  1.4
Gabon  3.0  9.0  1.3  -0  3  -5.0  -0 8  -1.2  -0.2
Gambia,  The  8.5  0.0  0.7  00  -2.5  -0.5  0.1  0.0
Ghana  1.4  8.1  0.2  -0.4  -0.7  -0.3  -0.1I  0.0
Grenada  5.6  6.6  0.5  -0.2  -3.2  -0.6  -3.4  -0.9
Guatemala  8.4  3.7  1.3  -0.2  2.4  0.3  3.6  0.4
Guinea  1.5  0.0  1.2  0.0  -3.4  -0.7  0 1  0.1
Guinea-Bissau  11  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1
Guyana  13.0  5.0  13  -0.  1  55  05  162  1.3
Haiti  1.2  00  08  00  -5 0  -0.9  0.0  0.0
Honduras  9.8  4.3  1.5  -0.4  1.4  0.2  1.9  0.2
Hungary  5.7  14.3  0.7  -0.3  1.5  0.3  4.0  0.5
Iceland  0.4  3.4  1.4  -0.6  -1.0  0.3  -45  2.3
India  5.0  5 7  1.5  0.1  2.2  08  01  0.0
Indonesia  5.3  0.9  0.8  -0.4  -1.6  -1.4  -0.3  -0 3
Iran,  Islamic Rep.  3.6  -1.4  1.6  -0.4  -3  2  -1  1  -0.4  -0.2
Israel  6.3  0.0  0.1  -0.4  -0  1  -0.3  0.3  -1.0
Jamaica  14.4  5.9  1.5  -0 3  2.5  00  47  0.0
Japan  96  18.1  0.7  -0. 1  -2.8  -1.4  64.8  -0.5
Jordan  4.9  3.6  0.4  -0.2  -3.8  -1.0  -1.6  -0.4
38Kenya  4.0  3.9  1.4  -0.5  OS'  0.3  0.3  0.2
Korea, Rep.  7.2  18.1  -1.1  -0.  1  -2.4I  -1.6  18.0  -1.2
Kuwait  5.8  0.0  0.7  0.0  -5.2  -0.9  0.2  0.0
Kyrgyz Republic  6.8  -2.8  2.1  -0.2  1.5  0.9  0.6  0.3
Latvia  9.6  -0.6  1.2  -0.5  -2.!;  -0.6  -1.3  -0.4
Lithuania  9.1  1.3  2.1  -0.3  0  8  0.2  2.8  0.3
Macao  4.3  0.0  0.4  0.0  -3.5  -0.6  0 6  0.1
Madagascar  2.5  1.0  0.9  -0.4  -1J.2:  -0.1I  -o. I  0.0
Malawi  8.4  5.0  2.9  -0.3  3.7  1.3  1.5  0.5
Malaysia  7 9  1.2  0.6  -0.3  -3.0  -1.1  0.2  -1 5
Maldives  0.0  6.3  2.5  -0.2  -5.3  -0.8  -4.8  -0.8
Mali  1.2  3.1  3.8  -0.  1  0.4  3.3  0.1  2.0
Malta  26.0  -0.4  0.2  -0 5  -2.1  -0.9
Mauritania  2.3  0.0  1 8  0.0  -3.4  -1.1  0 0  0.0
Mauritius  13.9  6.2  1.4  -0.2  3.2  0.0  19.5  0 1
Mexico  5.2  8.4  0.9  0.5  -0.5  -0.9  0.6  -0.5
Mongolia  1.3  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.2  0.6  0 3  0.2
Morocco  5.5  15.7  1.2  -0.3  -1.8  -0.9  2 1  -0.5
Myanmar  7.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  3.7  0.3  0.3  0.0
New Zealand  6.3  -4.5  1  0  -0.7  4.4  0.7  42.7  6.5
Nicaragua  6.4  2.9  1.2  -0  3  0.7  0.1  0.7  0.1
Niger  5.8  0.0  0.3  0.0  -1.8  -0.9  0.1  0.0
Nigeria  2.0  0.7  0.5  0.0  -2.6  -0.8  0.0  0 0
Norway  5.0  3.0  2.0  -0.6  -2.5  -0.8  2.5  -2.6
Oman  5.7  -0.3  1.0  -0.4  -3.5  -0.9  -4.6  -1.2
Pakistan  4.8  4.6  2.1  -0.2  0.6  0.4  0 1  0.0
Panaina  19.4  3.4  2.0  -0.4  5.2  0.3  7.9  0.4
Papua New Guinea  1.5  9.9  0.6  -0.2  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.2
Paraguay  0.9  4.0  2.8  -0.5  -0.2  2.2  -0.1I  3.0
Peru  2.0  7.7  -2.2  1.6  -1.3  -0.3  -0 7  -0.1I
Philippines  12.8  10.6  0.9  -0.3  0 6  -0.6  0 6  -0.2
Poland  8.7  5.3  2.0  -0.5  -0.9  -0.5  -0.3  -0 3
Qatar  4.6  0.0  0.6  0.0  -4.8  -0.5  0.2  0.0
Romania  5.2  8.1  1.2  -0.5  -0.7  -0.2  0.1  0.0
Russian  Fed.  4.1  1.1  2.1  -0.5  -2 9  -0.  1  -0.4  0.0
Rwanda  1.2  2.5  1.0  0(2  -1.4  -0.2  0.0  0.0
Saudi Arabia  4.2  2.0  1.4  -0.3  -4.8  -1.2  -41  -21I
Senegal  2.6  0.0  2.8  0.0  -2.5  -0.7  0.1  0.1
Sierra Leone  1.7  0.0  0.8  0.0  -2.1  -0.4  0.0  0 0
Singapore  6.6  -2.7  0.9  -04  -2.0  -0.4  -10.3  -2.2
Slovak Republic  6.4  0.0  0.8  0.0  -0.6  -0.2  2.0  0.4
Slovenia  7.1  2.5  2.2  -0.2  -2.3  -0.6  -3 1  -0.6
Solomon Islands  1.6  14.2  0.0  -0.21  0.3  0.0  0.5  0.0
South Africa  6.5  -0.2  1.3  0.5  0 6  0.1  0.5  0.2
Sri Lanka  6.1  15.0  1.9  -0.3  -3.5  -0.7  -0.2  -0.2I
St. Kitts  and Nevis  14 3  13.1  1.4  -0.3  2.8  0  3  18.7  1.6
St. Lucia  24.2  10.2  2.3  -0.2  7.1  0.6  34.4  2.8
St. Vincent/Grenadines  20.1  5.7  2.1  -0.2  3.4  0.2  29.0  1.1
Sudan  5.7  2.0  1.3  -0.4  2.2  0.5  . 0.4  0.1
Surinanme  10.7  5.6  1.0  -0.2  3.9  0.3  10.3  0.7
Taiwan  10.4  4.5  0.9  -0.4  -1.7  -1.8  -1.4  -3.2
Tanzania  3.0  13.3  2.0  -0.5  1.0  1.3  0.2  02
Thailand  12.4  6.4  0.6  0.0  4.2  0.3  4.8  0.3
Togo  1.0  0.0  2.9  0.0  -0.6  1.7  0.2  0.7
Trinidad and Tobago  11.2  5.4  2.2  -0.3  -2.2  -0.8  -2  3  -2.4
'Tunisia  1.4  10.5  1.2  0.5  -2.3  -1.1  -1.2  -0.7
Turkey  6.7  6.5  0.2  -0.21  0.4  -0.5  0.8  -0.3
Uganda  1.9  5.3  1.2  -0.4  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.1
United  Arab Emirates  5.6  0.0  1.1  0.0  -3.4  -0.4  2.8  0.6
United States  3.3  6.0  0.5  -0.5  0.3  1.0  2.7  2.7
Uruguay  6.4  4.8  0.8  0.1  2.9  0.7  7.6  2.8
Venezuela  8.5  6.8  0.2  0.3  -2.3  -1.1  -0.8  -0.4
Zambia  6.0  5.3  2.3  -0.4  2.5  0.8  0.2  0.1
Zimbabwe  7.9  1  1.5  2.7  -0.5  3.5  2.4  2.1  0.8
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